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Next: Introduction

Towards an Information-Neutral Voting Scheme That Does Not Leave Too Much To Chance

Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association 54th Annual Meeting, April 18-20, 1996

Lorrie Faith Cranor
Department of Engineering and Policy

Ron K. Cytron
Department of Computer Science

Washington University
St. Louis, MO 63130


We examine a new voting procedure that allows voters to express their preferences in the form of a voting strategy --- a first-order function which specifies a vote. We examine the calculations necessary to formulate such voting strategies, and present examples which illustrate the effects of risk. The voting framework we discuss allows rational voters to vote strategically using decision-theoretic techniques to select their optimal strategies, even if they have no prior information about the preferences of others and are unfamiliar with decision theory; moreover, randomness can be introduced into the framework to increase resistance to manipulability while maintaining outcomes that do not leave too much to chance.

Lorrie Faith Cranor
Thu Apr 25 14:31:14 CDT 1996