Towards an Information-Neutral Voting Scheme That Does Not Leave Too Much To ChanceAbstractWe examine a new voting procedure that allows voters to express their preferences in the form of a voting strategy --- a first-order function which specifies a vote. We examine the calculations necessary to formulate such voting strategies, and present examples which illustrate the effects of risk. The voting framework we discuss allows rational voters to vote strategically using decision-theoretic techniques to select their optimal strategies, even if they have no prior information about the preferences of others and are unfamiliar with decision theory; moreover, randomness can be introduced into the framework to increase resistance to manipulability while maintaining outcomes that do not leave too much to chance. CitationLorrie Faith Cranor and Ron K. Cytron. Towards an Information-Neutral Voting Scheme That Does Not Leave Too Much to Chance. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 18-20, 1996. Full Text
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