We have presented the declared-strategy voting paradigm and described two types of voting systems that can be implemented under this paradigm: batch DSV and ballot-by-ballot DSV. We have also discussed the problem of rational-strategy formulation and presented an automated strategy formulation system that allows voters to submit only their cardinal preferences for each candidate in order to have their optimal strategies formulated automatically. Our strategy formulator uses the expected-utility model of voting in conjunction with our novel technique for calculating pivot probabilities. We also expand on the expected-utility model, allowing voters to use tie-breaking rules when they are indifferent between alternatives. We have presented simulations of both types of DSV applied to several real and hypothetical voting situations.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We begin by examining the impact of DSV on those concerned with policy decisions. We then examine issues relevant to the acceptance or rejection of DSV by various populations. While it would be premature to conclude that DSV will be accepted or rejected by a given population, we offer an analysis of some of the factors that might determine its acceptance. Finally, we describe some future directions for both improving DSV and assessing its impact and acceptance by real populations.

lorrie@acm.org